Malware such as banking Trojans are popular with financially-motivated cybercriminals. Detection of banking Trojans remains a challenging task, due to the constant evolution of techniques used to obfuscate and circumvent existing detection and security solutions. Having a malware taxonomy can facilitate the design of mitigation strategies such as those based on evolutionary computational intelligence. Specifically, in this paper, we propose a cyber kill chain based taxonomy of banking Trojans features. This threat intelligence based taxonomy providing a stage-by-stage operational understanding of a cyber-attack, can be highly beneficial to security practitioners and the design of evolutionary computational intelligence on Trojans detection and mitigation strategy. The proposed taxonomy is validated by using a real-world dataset of 127 banking Trojans
I. Introduction
In our current Internet-connected society, e-commerce and e-government (e.g. e-banking and e-payment systems) are becoming the norm in developing and developed nations. Such systems and services can and have been targeted by cyber criminals [1] - [6] , and malware is a popular or common tool used by cyber criminals [7] - [9] . For example, a cyber-attack in South Korea reportedly saw 32,000 computers belonging to broadcasting organizations and banks infected with a malware that overwrote the Master Boot Record (MBR) [8] . Also, in 2013, the Crypto-Locker ransomware reportedly infected more than three million machines, causing more than 6 million USD worth of damages [10] . Malware can be broadly categorized in different aspects like network based and those that aren't network related [11] , and further categorised into adware, spyware, virus, worms, backdoors, rootkits and Trojans [11] - [16] .
Adware are designed with the purpose of displaying adverts in the computers they are running. Spyware as the term suggest, they spy on users without their knowledge and the information gathered can be used for all sort of purpose by the adversary [15] . Virus is a malicious code that spread through direct contact i.e. it must attach itself to another running program for it to reproduce/work [17] . Worms have the capability of self-replication and destruction i.e. does not depend on another program, often deletes data files from computers [11] , [15] , [17] . Backdoors also called trap doors, are malicious code embedded in applications or operating system with the intention of providing programmer access without requiring ordinary authentication method [11] . Rootkits are sets of software tools that enable an unauthorized user to gain administrative-level control of a computer system without being detected [11] , [18] , [19] .
Trojans consists of two parts, server side which is usually small (few KBs) that runs on attacked host and client side that runs on attacker's console [15] , [17] . Trojans have many ways of working, depending on the design they may facilitate/perform capabilities like backdoor, sniffing, spamming and so on [11] , [15] , [17] . There are many kinds of Trojans example Crypto-Locker that encrypts user files and request ransom to decrypt, Zeus a Trojan that steals victims online banking credentials to steal money from their account [17] , these are also known as Banking Trojans.
Note: For the final published version of the paper please refer to: Dennis Kiwia, Ali Dehghantanha, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Jim Slaughter, "A Cyber Kill Chain Based Taxonomy of Banking Trojans for Evolutionary Computational Intelligence", (Elsevier) Journal of Computational Science, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jocs.2017.10.020 3 communication with the compromised host(s). Finally, in actions on objectives, an adversary takes planned activities on target(s) (i.e. exfiltration of data) to achieve the intended goals.
Using threat model like CKC and aligning patterns of threat attacks to it, will allow researchers and security experts to speak in one language i.e. CKC. And in this language, we will be highlighting what to look for at each stage of the kill chain to support an intelligent-derived defensive and investigative tactics for analysts and experts in organisations to perform their day-to-day tasks against APT. For example: highlighting delivery features of Trojans, security teams will know what to expect and anticipate the countermeasure to prevent or minimise the likelihood of success at that stage. In providing data exfiltration tactics used by Trojans will assist in the analysis of traffics to identify malicious traffics identifiers and prevent data loss from organisations.
In this paper, we propose a CKC-based taxonomy for banking Trojan features which can be used to inform detection and mitigation strategies, such as those based on evolutionary computational intelligence. The practicality of the taxonomy is then validated against 127 banking Trojan samples collected from December 2014 to January 2016 from a real-world banking environment in the United Kingdom (see Appendix I). The Trojans were collected from multiple phishing campaigns that contained office attachments or a Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) encoded messages, which were reverse engineered to obtain the download URL for the executable file. Initial analysis on the executable was done using a tool called Static0.1 written by one of the authors (available at: https://github.com/slaughterjames/static/) and dynamic analysis by using https://malwr.com/ and https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/ to obtain C&C server address as quick as possible and other indicators of compromise (IOC) so as to block the malware to prevent damage to the company. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first Trojan taxonomy based on CKC.
This paper is organized as follows: Related work is given in Section II, in Section III the proposed Banking Trojans Features Taxonomy is covered, Section IV provides proposed Banking Trojans Defence Taxonomy and Section V covers Concluding Remark.
II. Related Work
A taxonomy can be described as a classification that uses ontology with primary purpose of providing basis for processing, communicating and reasoning about the cyber-related threats [35] . Intelligence gathering has become one of the key aspect for successful defence against cyber-attacks, and taxonomies can play an essential part in supporting security experts to achieve this [35] , [36] . In the following we review previous taxonomies produced by scholars on different variants of malware.
Weaver et al., proposed a taxonomy of computer worms based on the worm target discovery and selection strategies, carrier mechanisms, activation, and payloads [37] . Jacob et al., proposed a taxonomy for malware behaviours and divided malicious programs based on their behaviour into two main families namely simulationbased and formal detectors [38] . Lindorfer et al., suggested a taxonomy for malware evasive behaviours based on detecting environmental variables [39] . Ugarte-Pedrero et al., suggested a taxonomy for malware packers based on their runtime complexity measurement and code obfuscation method [40] .
Karim et al., proposed a taxonomy for mobile botnets [41] . With emergence of mobile malwares, a taxonomy for mobile malware behavioural detection was proposed [42] followed by an android malware attack vectors taxonomy based on attackers modus-operandi [43] . Khattak et al., proposed taxonomies of botnet features and botnet detection and prevention techniques [36] . Dagon et al., developed a taxonomy of botnets structure depicting botnets key metrics and response strategies [44] . Gupta et al., proposed a taxonomy of various types of phishing attacks and defence solutions [45] . Rodríguez et al., proposed a taxonomy of POS (Point of Sale) RAM scraping malwares behaviour [46] .
With each evolution of malware trends scholars have tried to produce a taxonomy for that trend to assist security experts to understand that trend so to create/implement appropriate defence. No taxonomy has been attempted to cover the notorious Banking Trojans in supporting security experts on the banking/financial industry sector. Further enhancing the taxonomy by aligning it with a well-known threat intelligence could be even more useful to security experts in different industries. This paper is aiming to cover that gap basing on effects banking Trojans have on banking/financial industry and its customers. This taxonomy will assist security experts to identify at which stage should the defence be thought from that will be both cost effective and useful for both the organisation and its customers.
III. Proposed Banking Trojans Features Taxonomy
While reconnaissance is all about gathering information in preparation of an attack, in this paper we will purposely overlook this stage due to two main reasons. One there are many ways recon can be done which makes the subject space too huge and we do not want to concentrate on that. And second reason is essentially any attack can be a reconnaissance stage of another attack. However, Trojan attacks do utilise reconnaissance stage like any other cyber-attack. The features this paper will concentrate on are Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, C2 and Actions on Objectives to give readers the knowledge of Trojan's behaviours in these stages and how they accomplish their goals in each stage. Basing on validation by using the 127 Trojan samples collected from a real-world banking environment in the UK (see Appendix I), we present the proposed banking Trojans features taxonomy in Figure 2 . Appendix II presents the mapping between the collected Trojans' features and our suggested Trojan features taxonomy. 
Weaponization
Weaponization is an essential step to increase success of an attack by reducing opportunities for attack detection and limiting forensics investigators abilities to analyse detected threats [47] . Banking Trojans are employing variety of techniques to disguise detection on host-level and network-level and defeat cyber investigators.
Host-based Evasion
Host-based cyber defence is mainly relied on Anti-Virus (AV) and end-point security solutions installed on the host machines, which scans for known virus signatures or detect and limit malicious behaviours [48] , [49] . Banking Trojans are using different techniques to install themselves on a host while remain undetected as follow.
Embedding Malicious Code Within Benign Applications:
Embedding a malicious code within a benign payload (application) using techniques such as process hollowing [50] - [53] would allow a malicious program to run within a known good process space and evade AVs detection even if the malware signature exists in the AV database [54] , [55] . Adversaries that embed their executables within benign applications will infect the host next time that the benign app is called [49] , [55] , [56] . Client application data files such as Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Office documents are often used in this stage [20] . Out of 127 banking Trojans analysed in this research (shown in Appendix I), 96% utilised Microsoft Office and 4% utilised PDF.
Heap Spraying; in this technique, malicious (shell) codes are divided into several pieces that are loaded in different locations on the heap memory so there is no single chunk of data mapped to any AV's signatures [56] . This technique not only reduces the chance of attack detection but increases the possibility of successful attack as adversary does not need to know the exact shell-code address in the heap but piece together shellcode elements using pre-defined gadgets [57] . As an example, Trojan 29 (see Appendix I -MD5 hash of ab40142988527fe6ce585a9fdfce56ca) has leveraged this technique to avoid detection. A potential jump to a section in a memory can be observed by memory analysis, a malware will have an instruction to execute a shell code in a specific offset e.g. "0x13ea60 (67): [*] Executing shellcode at offset: 0x1dbd8".
Network-based Evasion
Firewalls and Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) are the most common forms of network protection mechanisms. Similar to any other protection mechanism, the network perimeter defence solutions are having their own limitations i.e. a malicious document attached to an email is likely to bypass IDS while an executable would be subject to heavy scrutiny [54] , [58] . Banking Trojans are using different techniques to avoid network-based detection as follow:
Anti-Forensics Techniques
Attackers not only evade detection mechanisms but also they will try to make it difficult for forensics investigators to understand their intentions [69] , [70] . Malwares can exploit systems in ways to make it difficult to be realised or investigated easily. For example: Android malwares can perform a Cross App Exploitation whereby a genuine app is exploited by another app [71] and in scale-free networks (SFNs), nodes running similar software (monoculture) can spread malware among them due to similar vulnerabilities in software [72] both approach makes it difficult for investigators to identify the source of attack.
Apart from techniques like cross app exploitation and exploitation of the monoculture, at the malware level tools that are used by legitimate programmers to protect their programs from tampering or deter reverse engineers can also be used to pack and obfuscate malwares to throw investigators off track [29] , [55] , [73] . One of the most common anti-forensics technique used at the malware level is obfuscation. Obfuscation is a deliberate act of disguising codes to make investigation more difficult. Similar to other malwares Banking Trojans are employing different obfuscation techniques as follows [29] , [74] :
Dead-Code Insertion; this technique involves adding ineffective instructions to a programme to change its appearance but maintain its behaviour [29] , [73] , [74] . It could be as simple as adding "NOP" instructions in the malware code or putting hundreds of code lines which are never executed or serve no purpose [57] , [73] . This technique is quite often used and 76 of Trojans analysed have indicated utilisation of this technique (see Appendix II). While this technique could be circumvented by removing ineffective instructions prior to analysis, detecting those instructions is quite time consuming [26] , [74] - [78] .
Utilising Packers; in this technique the malware encrypts its main body and only include a decrypting module which decode encrypted instructions at run time [29] , [73] . This technique creates difficulties in static code analysis and code reversing [37] as investigator should either extract instruction from memory dumps or write/find a decryption tool [29] , [55] , [79] . Moreover, parkers change malwares signature hence, makes the Trojan invisible to signature-based detection technologies [31] , [40] , [42] , [48] .
Delivery
Once adversaries have completed Weaponization stage they should find a way to deliver their malicious payload to intended targets [36] , [80] - [82] . The most common methods of malicious payload delivery by banking Trojans are email attachments, social engineering and drive by download [17] , [20] , [23] , [31] .
Email attachments
Email communication is heavily utilised in most organisations and often associated with an office document or PDF attachment. These attachments may contain malicious codes in the form of macros (Microsoft Office documents) or Java Scripts (PDF files) [58] , [83] . Once a user enables macros in an office document it may download a payload that contain a Trojan. Similarly if a PDF is viewed by a privileged user, a JavaScript can be automatically launched to run a malicious shellcode [27] , [84] . Since anti-virus software often fail to detect these hidden malware and there is a good chance for users to run the file this mechanism becomes highly effective for delivering Trojans [54] , [58] , [83] .
Social Engineering
Attackers that uses banking Trojans like Dridex, Zeus and Spyeye widely explored social engineering to prey on user's weaknesses, hoping the recipient will press a link to open a malicious web page or an attachment with embedded malicious code [54] , [58] , [83] . According to Symantec report [85] on Dridex campaign attackers have sent 271,019 disguised as financial emails e.g. invoice, orders and receipts between Nov 2015 to Jan 2016 to deliver their Trojan. This is a form of social engineering to lure a victim to open the attachment thinking it's something of importance but the attachment contains a malware that is activated through macros or JavaScript embedded on the document [86] - [88] . In our dataset, we found 122 Trojans that are delivered using office documents and 5 delivered using PDF files (see Appendix II).
Drive-by Download
This mechanism utilises active contents such as a JavaScript or ActiveX [36] to make the users knowingly (by authorizing to run the active content) or unknowingly download attackers malicious contents while browsing a compromised or specially crafted web page [17] , [36] . Adversaries may include the malicious code in a seamless object like an advert or a widget and eventually lure a victim to download a Trojan without intending to do so [17] .
Exploitation
After delivery of the malware, intruders' code should be triggered on the target machine by running the malicious application or exploiting a system vulnerability [20] , [23] , [31] . A successful exploitation may lead to exfiltration of private information, injection of code into web applications, log keystrokes, steal passwords, steal cookies or download other modules that may perform intended malicious activities. Banking Trojans are utilising a variety of techniques for exploitation which can be categorised into Web injection, key stroke logging and API hooking.
Webinject
Trojans are equipped with a functionality called web-inject [22] , that can silently modify a webpage on the infected victim's machine to intercept private credentials such as username, password and even 2 nd factor authentication credentials [21] , [22] . Two main features are mostly utilised for web injection by banking Trojans as follow:
Form Grabber: this is one of the famous techniques deployed for example by SpyEye Trojan, to manipulate and inject arbitrary contents into data transmitted between an HTTP(s) server and a client browser [21] , [22] . The module is placed between the browser rendering engine and the HTTP(S) API function, so that the Trojan has access to decrypted data even if an encryption is utilised (e.g. SSL). In this mechanism, the Trojan presents the victim browser with a web page which is almost identical to the requested online banking site, while web form fields contents such as username and password are intercepted by the Trojan.
Userland Rootkits;
In this technique the Trojan uses communication API hooking to inject its malicious code during initialization of victim's web browser and intercepts and manipulates web traffic [21] . Zeus v.2 is a well-known Trojan leveraging this technique by manipulating WININET.DLL library in loading of Internet Explorer by hooking high-level API communication functions such as HttpQueryInfoA, HttpSendRequestA, InternetReadFile, InternetReadFileExA, etc., in user-mode. Therefore, the Trojan can conveniently intercept data before it gets encrypted in sessions secured by HTTPS [21] .
Keystroke Logging
In Keystroke logging an adversary covertly records user's keystroke as they are being typed either through a software program or a hardware device or even by monitoring electromagnetic emissions. Deployed through variety of methods, malware programmers often leverage software key loggers as a payload or a client-side exploit [89] , [90] . Software based keystroke logging can be implemented in kernel, hypervisor or in memory.
Kernel-based Keystroke Logging; this technique requires privileged access to the victim machine since the malware should run as root or system administrator. This type of keystroke logging is facilitated by kernel-mode rootkits, where by the rootkits modify the kernel code (for example system calls) or kernel data to change the kernel behaviour in order to enforce stealthy capabilities to hide malicious activities i.e. kernel level keystroke logging [91] . Keystroke logging done at this level are immune to techniques that reveal user-mode activities [91] , [18] , [19] .
Hypervisor-based Keystroke Logging; This type of Trojans resides on hypervisor level which is "Ring -1" [91] lower than kernel (i.e. "Ring 0"). Therefore, these Trojans are much stealthier giving more control to attackers. Virtual Machine Based Rootkits (VMBR) install a virtual machine monitor (VMM) underneath the existing operating system that facilitates hypervisor keylogging by Trojans. Once a machine is infected the malware can modify the VMM's emulated network card and log all network packets or use virtual-machine introspection to trap instructions and reconstruct data from the target system whilst being invisible to the target OS [18] . Since virtual-machine introspection can trap all SSL socket write calls, clear text data can be logged before being encrypted [18] .
In-Memory Injection; this keylogging mechanism can be achieved by patching memory tables or injecting directly into a process memory. Direct Memory Access (DMA) technique is usually used for injecting a key logger into a process [92] , [93] . As memory injection happens at user level, attacker only requires similar privilege as injecting process for successful deployment of a keystroke into the process memory [90] .
API Hooking
API hooking is a technique by which the behaviour and flow of applications can be influenced and modified through inserting memory break point and JMP (jump) instructions. API functions manipulations on system libraries such as Kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll and ntdll.dll can provide a privileged access to attackers [21] . Inline hooks, and Import Address Table ( IAT) hooks are the main API hooking techniques implemented by different banking Trojans.
Inline Hooking: this is a common Windows API hooking technique that replaces the byte code of an API function with a code redirection instruction to a code section controlled by the Trojan [21] . The 5 bytes at the beginning of every Windows system function for hot patching provides needed space for Trojan to implement this technique [21] . The 5 bytes will be replaced with NOP sled (No-operations slide) that will perform unconditional jump to a code section that contains Trojan code. Analysis of a memory dump from a compromised machine using volatility framework on Kali with command like "vol.py apihooks" can reveal in line hooking done by Trojans. [21] , [94] . An IAT hook, overwrites the original destination of an imported API function and points it to the attacker code. Therefore, executing the application would load and run Trojan codes as well i.e. will activate the Trojan on the destination/host device.
Import Address

Installation
In this stage the adversaries try to extend their access to more systems and compromise more nodes. Trojan developers often use tactics that are not easily detectable like DLL side loading and Heap Spray for a successful installation [20] , [31] .
DLL Side-Loading
Windows allows applications to load Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) by either specifying full path of the DLLs or using DLL redirection, or utilising a manifest [95] . If none of these locate the DLL, then Windows will perform a search through predefined directories like WinSxS [95] - [97] . Attackers abuse this feature by putting their malicious DLLs in higher priority locations than original location of benign DLLs, hence the application would load the malicious DLLs instead [95] . With the use of Windows' Side-by-Side (WinSxS or SxS) a Trojan can load any malicious DLL from i.e. %WINDIR%\WinSxS (e.g. C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.windows.commoncontrols_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.9600.16384_none_a9f4965301334e09) [95] . Due to the fact, most of this libraries are white listed in the National Software Reference Library (NSRL) database, most end-points will use this database to reduce false positives in their detection and since the execution of these libraries is done in the memory, this allows malicious attackers to perform more persistent attack with this technique as the detection will be ignored by most end-point protection software [95] .
Heap Spray
This technique increases the chance of successful attack because attackers do not need to know the exact location of their malicious code in heap [57] . The heap spraying attack insert as many malicious code blocks as possible into the heap [57] . This technique usually is carried out in two phases i.e. NOP-sled and shell code, the NOP-sled reduces the chance of detection [28] , [56] , [57] , [98] . Heap spraying usually uses a large amount of memory as it uses string object of JavaScript, the technique are mostly commonly used to compromise web browser and also on malicious PDF [56] , [57] , [98] . On Trojan "Trojan 29" this was observed clearly, when the binary reached address (0x13ea60) of its execution there is an instruction to execute shell code in the offset 0x1dbd8 "0x13ea60 (67): [*] Executing shellcode at offset: 0x1dbd8".
Command and Control (C2)
This is a mechanism by which a malware registers to its Command and Control (C&C) server [20] , [23] , [31] , [36] , [81] . Malware are registering on a C&C domain to receive commands or upload exfiltrated data. APT adversaries will make use of techniques of confidentiality and privacy such as utilisation of relay networks to ensure their anonymity to avoid prosecution [99] . A Trojan may find its C&C server through hard coded IP addresses or through domain lookup.
Hard Coded IP Address
This mechanism provides the C&C address by means of static IP address coded in the malware binary or by means of seeding [36] . In seeding the programmer provides the Trojan with an initial list of active peers in the botnet which are hidden anywhere on the infected machine with an elusive name to make it difficult to be detected. This mechanism is considered primitive since reverse engineering of the Trojan can easily lead to retrieval of the IP addresses or may even lead to detecting the actual botmaster.
Domain Lookup
The use of domain name system (DNS) is also very common among banking Trojans [100] . Unlike IP addresses, domain lookup provides stealthier tactical advantage to the malware developers due to its more complex nature. This mechanism has several advantages from the attacker's perspective such as:
 Any IP address can be linked to the domain name by the attacker, hence defeating IP blocking defence solutions.  Completely blocking all the IPs linked to a domain name can be almost impossible as the attacker may reroute the traffic through several bots (stepping stones) before reaching the true Botmaster.  Taking down a domain is complicated as it requires a lot of formalities. Attackers have several options to include a domain name in their Trojans as follow:
Hardcoded; Pre-defined domain names are hard-coded in the strings of the binary like in the case of IP address [36] [31] , [101] . This mechanism may produce different domain names each time the malware restarts and creates more polymorphic behaviour hence a stealthier malware. Generated Domain Names; The domain name can be dynamically generated by an algorithm (Domain Generation Algorithm) that is known to the attacker and the malware [36] , [82] . Unlike cache poisoning this mechanism produces random domain name depending on the algorithm which also creates more polymorphic behaviour of the malware and makes it even stealthier [80] , [82] . The difference between this technique and the cache poisoning attack is that in the cache poisoning the malware makes use of the domain cached in victim DNS while in this mechanism the malware produces a random domain name [31] .
Out of 127 analysed Trojans 22 had IP addresses hardcoded while 13 utilised DNS only while the rest were using a combination of both IP and DNS for C2 (see Appendix II).
Actions on Objectives
After an attack has completed all other steps in the kill chain what is left is to accomplish its objectives which could be data exfiltration and/or system disruption [20] , [23] , [31] . Banking Trojans have mostly concentrated their objectives in exfiltrating sensitive data from their victims for financial gain. Different banking Trojans utilises different technics to accomplish this but in high level this is done through a backdoor, FTP (File Transfer Protocol) or even Web and mobile apps. Banking Trojans like Carberp had gone to a level of implementing randomly generated cryptographic cipher to encrypt data obtained from the victim while sending back to its C&C [31] , [102] , [103] , this way it ensures the payload is not blocked by any control such as data loss prevention devices.
Backdoors
Attackers often install a secret exit that allows them to send, receive or control victim machines remotely which is known as backdoor [45] , [48] . Backdoor can be described as a feature or defect of a computer system that allows surreptitious unauthorized access to data [3] , [104] .
HTTP-based backdoors are very common in banking Trojans, due to their easiness in bypassing connection restrictions and detection. Moreover, the POST and GET commands are of the utmost interest when it comes to data exfiltration, both by receiving and sending data [33] , [46] . 112 out of 127 Trojan samples in our dataset make use of backdoors for C&C communication via GET/POST HTTP requests (see Appendix II). Other than file upload, backdoors provide other means or advantages to attackers like remote login or even in-depth reconnaissance without users' knowledge [10] , [31] , [43] . Analysing web traffic with sniffer like wireshark you can observe payloads associated with GET/POST command and identify if data exfiltration is taking place and what kind of data is being exfiltrated.
IV. Proposed Banking Trojans Defence Taxonomy
In developing a banking Trojans defence taxonomy, we consider three dimensions, namely: detection, prevention and remedial actions [109] . The first level of our taxonomy comprises different types of defences, and the second level is constructed based on how a specific defence type can be applied. Detection techniques can run at the host or at the network [110] , while prevention techniques are classified as host-based, network-based and user training. Finally, remedial actions are divided into defensive and offensive activities; each linked to different techniques [36] . 
Detection
Detection techniques provide opportunities to identify a malicious attack in its early stages i.e. during reconnaissance, weaponization or delivery [20] , [31] . Detection can be conducted on host or network level.
Host Based Detection
The most common host based detection tools are Antivirus (AV) software which utilise two detection methods namely signatures-based or behavioural-based [2] , [48] , [55] .
Signature-Based; Signature can be list of domains which are known to be malicious or hashes of the known malware [48] . These signatures are stored in a large repository for the sake of comparison for malware detection [28] , [48] , [88] .
Hashes; hashes can either be MD5 or SHA, this mechanism is mostly preferable due to it consistence and accuracy [48] . AV vendors usually utilise a generic signature which is hash of the code segment to detect malware samples belong to the same family [48] , [49] .
Email Signatures;
Trojans can spoof sender's address to reflect well known organisations such as banks, power companies and post office. A signature based on these known malicious trends can be created along with a blocking rule on an IDS to prevent users from receiving such emails [111] , [112] . Although this strategy can be easily bypassed by adversaries, it is still effective in the absence of adversaries' knowledge of being shunned.
Behavioural Based; this type of detection aims to identify actions performed by malwares and trends of events rather than syntactic markers to identify an attack [38] , [88] , [113] . Behavioural/heuristic technique of detection can be either static or automated, although automated techniques are more practical than static ones [114] . While we appreciate the applicability of signature based detection in real life application, heuristic becomes more prominent as they can provide deep and effective analysis to determine the malicious behaviours of activities [114] - [118] . The reason this technique is most effective is because the behaviour of each Trojan can be emulated in a sandbox and analysed. Depending on methodology used to reduce false positives [117] , [118] , the technique may often be associated with the disadvantage and consumption of resources. With the rise in Internet of Things (IoT) behavioural detection can be enhanced with the intel gathered by this feature and that of machine learning capabilities [117] - [119] .
Network Based Detection
Network based detection techniques can be categorised into active or passive [2] , [81] . Active Detection; this technique involves interaction with information resources. Once a malware is detected a comparison is made with a set of previously generated malicious signatures [120] . The main active detection techniques are signature-based or network behaviour and timing based.
Signature-Based: IDS like SNORT uses sets of signatures to determine if an event is malicious or not [81] . The comparison could be based on simple features such as header of an email address, the sender's domain name or more complicated such as comparing an email with the blacklisted domains or known malicious activities. Of course this technique is vulnerable to zero-day attacks [121] as signatures will not be available in the database.
Network Behaviour & Timing; in this technique, the comparison is based on features such as if the connection is coming from a known malicious IP address, known vulnerable ports, or even analysis of dishonest requests. Moreover, timing of sent requests can be used as a feature to determine if they are robot made or human made i.e. multiple request in very short period of time usually signifies a bot origin [122] - [124] . Passive Detection; in this technique, we achieve detection through monitoring activities initiated by applications to distinguish between malicious Trojans and benign apps. In passive detection, the defender remain undetected and gather as much information as possible without spooking the adversary [120] . Following techniques can be used to hat detect malicious activities in C&C and Data exfiltration stage of an attack: Packet Inspection; when a Trojan is in rallying or exfiltration phase many indications of maliciousness can be observed by finding connections to a known blacklisted domains or IP addresses [125] . We can also observe payloads of individual packets from contents of GET or POST requests to deduce what the Trojan is sending or receiving [33] .
Analysis of Flow Records; this technique considers the flow of the entire traffic instead of individual packets. In this technique several attributes of communication streams are looked at such as source and destination addresses, port numbers, communication protocol, the duration of a session, and the cumulative size and number of transmitted packets [125] . With such attributes a detection matrix can be constructed to detect malicious activities not only in rallying and data exfiltration stage of the banking Trojans but also in the delivery stage.
Analysis Of Spam Records;
As Trojans are mostly delivered though unsolicited emails (referred to as spam) [125] , analysis of these emails can lead to establishment of a pattern or a detection matrix . Filters can be set to scan for specific fingerprints from subject headers, message bodies, white and even black lists email addresses [111] , [112] .
Analysis of Application Log Files; analysis of logs is not so different than spam emails, except that logs come from different sources i.e. firewalls, applications, servers etc.! The biggest challenge is analysing logs on a timely manner to detect malicious or just abusive behaviour of an application or users of the systems generating the logs [126] , [127] . When a Trojan run on a machine one can discover from a log file what files the Trojan has created, deleted, or DLLs that are injected etc.
Preventive
After a successful detection and information gathering of any attack, what follows next is putting in place safeguards to prevent future attacks. Preventive techniques can be categorized into host-based, network-based and user training.
Host Based
When considering prevention at the level of host machine, anti-malware, anti-spyware and other tools are the most commonly used [48] . With good enough detection signatures this technique is very useful though not all Trojans can be detected and prevented easily due to the variant created by adversaries. Recent Symantec security product [85] has highlighted its capability in detecting and preventing attacks from Dridex malware. The product has highlighted the capability of scanning attachments of the incoming emails on host level and preventing users from opening malicious attachments.
Furthermore, extensive access controls on confidential files should be considered to prevent Trojans sniffing around systems to gain usable intel. An Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) which allows user to define access to a specific piece of data depending on either a true or false outcome of a boolean expression on sets of attributed defined in a policy [128] . An ABE has been suggested by researcher as amongst powerful cryptographic tool that allows fine grained access control on data that can prevent malware from stealing your data [128] . On top of tools like ABE, other strong data encryption at rest ciphers can be useful to support host based preventive measures.
Network Based
When casting a wider net for prevention on your network, things tends to get complex but in a long run it's much easier managing attacks from their point of entry to your network rather than managing attacks on individual host machines. Some organisations have achieved this through implementation of SMTP and HTTP/SSL proxies [49] , whereby all traffic from the internet towards organisations' internal network must pass these gateways which provides extra layer of security. Moreover, these gateways can be configured with email filtering rules i.e. any incoming email will be assessed in correlation with the rules set and the system will decide if an email should be allowed into the network or not. Some organisations have done this by deploying network Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS). While one may argue the importance of having IPS while firewall already exist, the truth is firewalls themselves have limitations. Firewalls can block traffics basing on IP blocks and ports while an IPS monitors all traffic entering and exiting the network [129] . With organisations hosting webserver applications like Apache and Microsoft IIS, relying on firewall alone is ill-advised hence, having an IPS on your layered defensive security provides assurance while maintain functionality. The advantage of using an IPS as opposed to IDS is the ability of IPS to stop or redirect attacks pre-emptively [129] . With this feature an IPS is capable of redirecting attacks to the honeypot machine luring the attackers to believe success while giving the analyst ample time to analyse the attack and understand it in depth.
User Training
With ISO 27001 standard in play as a minimum requirement the provision of awareness training to all employees is mandatory. If users understand that most of the current Trojan attacks are based on spam campaign and receive appropriate training and act accordingly many Trojan attacks were never happened [130] . Furthermore, understanding that a Microsoft document or attachment may contain embedded malware will also give users a perspective on how to treat received attachments from a known or unknown sender.
Remedial
As part of defence strategies, a consideration of safeguard failure should always be accounted. In the event safeguards against Trojan attack were not successful, we need sets of remedial actions that enable us to revert the system to a point of proper functionality. Remedial activities can be divided into defensive and offensive. By defensive we are looking at the actions to be taken after infection to bring your system back to normal, prevent spreading of the infection and repetition of the infection. On offensive side, we are looking at the actions that allow us to gather more intelligence about an attack, get an insight of the attacker and possibly trace the attack to its origin with the sole purpose of dismantling the Trojan infrastructure.
Defensive Strategies
Once an infection has been identified, we need strategies to bring the system back to its normal functionalities. Even these steps have merits and demerits but with a good plan we can recover from an attack as quickly as possible. We further classify defensive strategies into those dealing with an individual host machine and those concerned with the entire network.
Host-based: on the host machine, several steps can be taken to remediate from a Trojan infection among which disinfection or reinstallation can be considered.
Disinfection; this simply means removing the Trojan from the infected machine. We know the ultimate non-functionality of Trojan is receiving a STOP or KILL command from its controller. If by technical means an investigator can figure out the Trojan self-destruction mechanism, it can be triggered to remove the infection [125] . However, there are off-shelf programs such as Trojan removal kits that can be used although their ultimate effectiveness is hard to guarantee.
Reinstallation; A complete reinstallation of an infected machine should be considered as the last option if disinfection is not viable as it takes longer time and involves much more activities. If a disk image of a clean installation is available, the process can be well shortened, otherwise a clean installation from preferred OS disk should be considered.
Network-based:
when the infection has spread to more than just one machine then the strategy should also span out accordingly. There are two main techniques for network based remedy of Trojans as follows:
Quarantine (Walled-garden): isolating machines with symptoms of malware infection either by seeing their connections to a known C&C or malicious downloads and uploads [36] , [125] is referred as walled-garden. Isolated machines are denied access to any other website except for the ones for remedial activates until the machine(s) is/are properly cleaned and pass security policies checks.
Block C&C: Trojans are receiving instructions from a controller (C&C server) and send collected information to C&C. Once a C&C server IP address is identified we need to block communication to the address to prevent Trojans from receiving instructions or sending information to the controller. The other way to deal with this is by only allowing traffic to known addresses and block all other communications to unknown addresses in the network.
Offensive strategies
The idea here is intelligent gathering while protecting live environment, and ultimately paralysing the Trojan botnet. With the utilisation of virtual machines or cloud based simulation platforms security experts can gather sufficient evidence up to successful prosecution provided the integrity of the evidence is accounted for [6] , [70] . With offensive strategies skiing on the edge of the line of legality and ethics, one needs to be very careful as attacking back is not only unethical but illegal too.
Honeypot Or Padded Cell Systems: Honeypots are legal traps, intentionally deployed in a network to detect or deflect unauthorised access to a system [2] , [125] , [131] . For clarity, this is not a legal advice for legal advice please consult your legal counsel/lawyer. Honeypots are often associated with three concepts when it comes to legal conception i.e. enticement, entrapment, and privacy. From legal litigation the three are applicable only if the aim was to prosecute someone, other than that honeypots are legal and can be used [132] . Honeypots are useful tools in understanding attacker's intentions, Honeypots contains no business data so any access to the honeypot is considered malicious. Honeypots are used to research and study attacks and discover new information about the strategies and practices used by malware creators. With honeypots two kinds of information can be gathered. First is type of attack vectors in operating systems and software used along with the actual exploit code and second are attackers activities performed on an exploited machine so as to come up with better defence tactics for such attacks [125] . Also institutional honeypots can be used for developing better training programs to enhance security awareness [133] .
Padded cells and honeypot use similar concept, but the distinct difference between the two systems is that, padded cells are highly protected and cannot be easily compromised as compared to honeypots [134] . In other words, padded cell is a hardened honeypot and operates in tandem with traditional IDS. With such systems in place, Trojan understanding becomes clearer to an organisation security team and better defence mechanisms are constructed with high percentage of certainty about future trends.
Distribution of Fake Credentials;
The main goal of a banking Trojans is online banking credentials, or credit and debit card details [125] . By identifying where stolen information is being submitted by a Trojan (also known as drop zone), crafted false and target-oriented information can be injected into these drop zones [36] , [125] , [135] . Therefore, mistrust between botmaster and their customer will be created and possibly run some players out of business and the entire malicious infrastructure may become useless. By associating the credentials with a monitored account, banks can trace the money and find where it is being transferred to and perhaps apprehend a botmaster [125] .
Spam Trap; Most Trojans are being distributed by spam campaigns [125] . Spam trap can be used to capture as much of the spam emails for further analysis. Spam trap is considered as the email address with no functionality other than receiving unsolicited emails [136] , [137] . The simplest setup of this trap is by advertising an email into many newsletters and forum to make it known so attackers will send their spam to that address. The evaluation of spam message along with its attachment and included links can assist security analysts to deduce information about malware families and even lead to detection of unknown families.
Most of the defence techniques like IDS and/or IPS are used both for detection and prevention but we should understand their limitations too. Defence techniques highly depend on correct and up to date information. For instance, detecting an embedded Trojan in an office document by an IDS system can be difficult but if the IDS system is properly configured on both network perimeter and host the chance of detection increases. Likewise, detection of signatures highly depends on the software in use, but with the consideration of up to date signatures and continuous maintenance/update of the software, organisation may not face difficulties in detecting attacks.
V. Concluding Remarks
While evolutionary computational intelligence approaches are a viable approach to designing intelligent and effective malware detection and mitigation solutions, having a features taxonomy can help inform the design of such approaches by reducing the impreciseness, subjectivity, and knowledge uncertainty in decision making process.
In this paper, we presented the first Cyber Kill Chain (CKC)-based taxonomy which details banking Trojans features, and validated the taxonomy based on real-world samples. Cyber defenders can then use the taxonomy to design their banking Trojans detection and mitigation strategy, including those based on evolutionary computational intelligence approaches. It is notable, that since as our proposed taxonomies are based on malware observed in financial sector in the UK, extra cautions should be taken in extending our results to other contexts.
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